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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  05-4419
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
ANTONIO M. TIRADO,
               Appellant
                                      
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No.: 04-CR-04E
District Judge: The Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
                                      
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 24, 2006
Before: SMITH, FISHER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 25, 2006)
                                       
OPINION
                                        
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
 Antonio M. Tirado, a convicted felon, was found guilty by a jury of knowingly
possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He was sentenced, inter alia,
to a term of 120 months’ imprisonment.  He filed a timely appeal, challenging both his
2conviction and his sentence.  We affirmed his conviction, but vacated his sentence and
remanded for resentencing in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  See United States v. Tirado, 133 Fed. Appx. 13
(3d Cir. 2005).
On remand, the parties were again afforded an opportunity to state their positions
with respect to sentencing factors.  The pre-sentence report assessed Tirado’s base
offense level at 24 under United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he
had a 1999 felony conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver which
qualified as a controlled substance offense and a 1997 simple assault conviction which
constituted a crime of violence.  An offense level of 24 together with Tirado’s Criminal
History Category of VI yielded a sentencing range of 100-125 months.  The upper limit of
this range was reduced to 120 months to comply with the statutory maximum of ten years
for a § 922(g)(1) offense.  
Tirado objected to the offense level of 24, contending that the marijuana
conviction should not have been considered in calculating his offense level because he
had been denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Tirado asserted that he should not
have been charged with a misdemeanor offense because of the small amount of marijuana
in his possession and that his state defense counsel was ineffective as he failed to
challenge this aspect of the state’s case.  Alternatively, Tirado urged the District Court to
consider these circumstances in this post-Booker resentencing, to look past a rigid
application of the guidelines, and to impose a below guideline sentence.  Additionally,
     1Tirado does not contend that the District Court’s calculation of the offense level of 24
was incorrect.  Accordingly, we need not address this issue.
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Tirado submitted that his felony assault conviction would not have qualified as a crime of
violence in any other state in this circuit and that the resulting disparity between his
guideline and that of defendants in other states weighed in favor of a below guideline
sentence.   In short, although Tirado did not explicitly argue that his criminal history
overstated the seriousness of his past criminal conduct, he implicitly pressed for a below
guideline sentence on this very basis. 
The prosecution pressed the District Court to impose the statutory maximum of ten
years.  It emphasized the extensiveness of Tirado’s criminal history and claimed that his
past “screams out to the court that this man needs to be taken off the street.”   
The District Court rejected Tirado’s contention that he had been constructively
denied the assistance of counsel on his marijuana conviction and concluded that the
offense level of 24 was correct.1  It acknowledged that the guidelines were only advisory
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker and that it must consider all of the factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary.”   The Court advised that it had “carefully considered” all of the factors set out
in § 3553(a) and declared that “[a]s was true at the original sentencing,” the record
demonstrated a significant criminal history, consisting of 17 prior adult and juvenile
convictions, Tirado’s “complete lack of remorse,”  and his “pattern of contempt for
authorities.”  The Court explained that the factors it found of “paramount importance” in
     2The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  See United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2006).
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exercising its discretion were the protection of the public and the deterrence of future
criminal conduct.  The Court again imposed a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment.
This timely appeal followed.2   Relying on Booker’s instruction that the guidelines
are only advisory and that sentences must be reviewed for reasonableness, 543 U.S. at
261, Tirado contends that the sentence imposed by the District Court was unreasonable. 
He submits that resentencing is warranted because the Court failed to respond to his
arguments, failed to state its reasons for the sentence imposed, gave presumptive weight
to the guidelines, and imposed a sentence that was greater than necessary to meet the
purposes of sentencing.  
In United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006), we instructed that “[t]o  
determine if the court acted reasonably in imposing the resulting sentence, we must first
be satisfied the court exercised its discretion by considering the relevant factors.”  Id. at
329.  In other words, the “record must demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.”  Id.  The burden is upon the defendant to
demonstrate unreasonableness.  Id. at 332.  Although we rejected the position that
reasonableness may be presumed if a sentence falls within the guideline range, id., we
acknowledged that a within guideline sentence is more likely to be reasonable.  Id.  The 
reasonableness of a sentence, however, is not determined by any “magic words that a
district judge must invoke when sentencing . . . .”  Id.   Instead, we must scrutinize the
record to verify that the “court considered the § 3553(a) factors and any sentencing
grounds properly raised by the parties . . . .”  Id. 
We disagree with Tirado’s contention that the District Court simply imposed the
same sentence that it had pre-Booker, completely failed to address his arguments, and did
not explain its reasons for the sentence imposed.  The record demonstrates that the
District Court heard lengthy arguments by counsel pertaining to whether Tirado’s past
convictions were more benign than they appeared in the pre-sentence report and weighed
in favor of a sentence below his guideline range of 100 to 120 months.  The District Court
was engaged in these arguments, asking questions and pointing out various details
regarding these convictions.  It was not persuaded, however, and explained that the
extensiveness of Tirado’s criminal history, his lack of remorse, and his contempt for
authorities weighed in favor of imposing the statutory maximum of ten years in order to
protect the public and to deter further criminal conduct.  This explication, contrary to
Tirado’s assertion, is sufficient to demonstrate that the Court exercised its discretion only
after weighing the § 3553(a) factors and considering the purposes for imposing a
sentence.  In light of this explanation, we find that the District Court’s sentence is not
unreasonable, and we will affirm its judgment.
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